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FELDSTEIN v. KAMMA UF
Nuisance Based On Aesthetic Considerations
Feldstein v. Kammauf
Residents of a suburb of Cumberland brought suit
against Feldstein, asking that he be restrained from operat-
ing and maintaining a junk yard on premises owned by him
and his sister. In 1939, the defendant had purchased prop-
1209 Md. 479, 121 A. 2d 716 (1956).
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erty, improved by a large warehouse, in a neighborhood
containing other business and commercial properties and
subject to neither use restriction nor zoning regulations.
He immediately started storing scrap metal and junk and
continued to use his land for this purpose. The original
complainants purchased their property in 1947, at which
time there was some junk stored on the defendant's land,
but the complainants alleged that before 1954 this material
was largely concealed by vegetation. The original com-
plainants were joined by neighbors whose homes had been
built between 1946 and 1954. In 1954, the defendant pur-
chased a tract of land adjacent to his other property and
began conducting junking operations on a large scale, haul-
ing quantities of scrap by rail, smashing the unmanageable
pieces with a large steel ball and burning wiring insulation.
The yard contained an unsightly assortment of barrels,
rails, wire, discs and tanks.
The chancellor decreed: (1) that the defendant reduce
and conceal from the view of all the residents of nearby
property the amount of scrap deposited on his property;
(2) that he not handle any material on the property be-
tween the hours of 9 P.M. and 7 A.M.; (3) that he not burn
anything which might cause offensive smoke, fumes or
soot; (4) that he not block, or allow his customers to block,
the county road leading to the property; (5) that he not
allow rats or mice to congregate on the property; (6) that
in the event he did not conceal the scrap and other ma-
terials, he should remove them from the premises. On
appeal, the defendant contested only that part of the de-
cree concerning the concealment of the scrap on the prem-
ises [(1) and (6)] which, he alleged, would compel him
to discontinue his business on its present site. The only
question which had to be considered, therefore, was
whether the defendant should be required to abide by the
contested part of the decree merely because of the un-
sightliness of his business. The complainants admitted that
a junk yard is not a nuisance per se but they relied heavily
on Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack,8 in which,
although the court refused to enjoin the defendant from
using his property as a storage yard for old automobiles
because the area was clearly a residential community, it
quoted with approval the following from State v. Harper4
State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168, 101 A. 703 (1917); Landay v. Zoning
Appeals Board, 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293, 114 A. L. R. 984 (1938).
8118 W. Va. 608, 191 S. E. 368, 370, 110 A. L. R. 1454 (1937).
'182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451,455, 33 A. L. R. 269 (1923).
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on the power of an equity court to enjoin the use of prop-
erty on purely aesthetic grounds:
"It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are
relative in their nature. With the passing of time, social
standards conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensi-
bilities are becoming more refined and that which
formerly did not offend cannot now be endured. That
which the common law did not condemn as a nuisance
is now frequently outlawed as such by the written law.
This is not because the subject outlawed is of a differ-
ent nature, but because our sensibilities have become
more refined and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous
smells have always come under the ban of the law, but
ugly sights and discordant surroundings may be just
as distressing to keener sensibilities. The rights of
property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an
ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be per-
mitted to plague the average or dominant human sensi-
bilities well may be pondered."
The Court of Appeals reversed sections 1 and 6 of the
decree and held, (Brune, C.J., dissenting) that since the
neighborhood was not "clearly residential", since none of
the property was subject to private use restriction or public
zoning regulations, since complainants had bought with
knowledge of the junk yard's existence, and since the de-
cree would have the effect of putting defendant out of busi-
ness, there was insufficient evidence of nuisance to require
that the junk be hidden from view or removed, regard-
less of whether equity may enjoin for purely aesthetic
considerations.
Although the sense of sight may perhaps be considered
superior to that of hearing and smell for purposes of
aesthetic perception, it has not traditionally been protected
under the doctrine of nuisances. In explanation, an early
English case stated that noises and odors manifestly may
adversely affect repose and health, which, like light and
air, are classed as necessities so that an action on the case
lies for their protection.5 This attitude of the early English
law has been reflected in the United States with little
exception.' Slowly, however, a change seems to be taking
5 William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1587).
0 Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting, A. & S. P. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 A.
267, 268 (1905) :
"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than of necessity, and It is necessity alone which justifies the




place and matters of taste, which were judicially accounted
as sentiment or luxury in the past, are now being consid-
ered among the necessities of a more sophisticated society.
Because of the judicial prejudice against any legal right
predicated upon a "merely aesthetic" complaint, the courts
have, at times, exercised devious reasoning in granting
equitable relief. Where there have been eyesores so
flagrant that their elimination became a necessity even
from the standpoint of the "average man", they have been
abated or brought under control through reasoning based
upon established grounds rather than mere aesthetics.' An
example of this circuitous reasoning is found in Cochran v.
Preston where the validity of a Baltimore City statute
regulating the height of a building in the Washington
Mounment area was challenged as unconstitutional on the
ground that the inspector of buildings was using the police
power as a cloak to hide purely aesthetic purposes.' The
Court categorically accepted the principle that in the exer-
cise of the police power, property rights cannot be impaired
by the legislative conception of artistic beauty. It was held,
however, that the ordinance was enacted for a more sub-
stantial reason than an aesthetic one - that its purpose
was to protect surrounding buildings from the ravages of
fire. A long and eloquent account of the Baltimore fire of
1904 was included in the opinion in an attempt to justify
the decision on the ground that tall buildings serve as large
funnels, furnishing drafts for flames. It might be suggested
that today the courts would be less critical of a legislative
objective of preserving the architectural beauty of the
particular locality.
While it is true that most cases have held that unsightly
structures are not nuisances even though they adversely
affect the value of adjoining property,9 one noteworthy
exception is Yeager v. Traylor.'0 There the Court held that
the construction of a garage in a strictly residential area
would be permitted if it conformed in architectural design
to the general character of the community and that an
effective screen be provided to hide the unsightly appear-
7 Comment, Billboard Regulation and the Aesthetic Viewpoint with
Reference to california Highways, 17 Cal. L. Rev. 120 (1929).
8 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113 (1908).
9 Northfield v. Board of Freeholders, 85 N. J. Eq. 47, 95 A. 745 (1915);
Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Harlow, 297 S. W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
See also Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 247 S. W. 810 (1923),
where it was held that the mere unsightliness of a building which is the
usual and natural result of dilapidation, does not make it a nuisance and
a city would have no authority to declare it a nuisance for that reason alone.
10 306 Pa. 530, 160 A. 108 (1932).
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ance resulting from the proposed practice of parking cars
on the roof of the building.
A new cognizance of aesthetic considerations has been
taken by the courts in the "funeral parlor" cases. Most
courts have held that although a funeral parlor is not a
nuisance per se, it may be enjoined as a nuisance in fact
when it is maintained in close proximity to residential
property.11 In an attempt to justify the use of the injunc-
tive power under the concept of a nuisance, however, sev-
eral courts have added that a funeral parlor causes de-
pressed feelings to persons of normal sensibilities living
in the neighborhood and weakens the powers of some to
resist disease.1"
If excessive noise13 and foul smells" are treated as
nuisances, why should there remain this invidious distinc-
tion against the sense of sight? Although it may be true
that perhaps noise and stench are more objectionable to the
average person and more difficult to avoid than unsightli-
ness, it seems clear that a thing which is visually offensive
may seriously affect the residents of a community in the
reasonable enjoyment of their homes. Of course, equitable
relief should not be granted merely to protect fastidiousness
of taste of a complainant, but only where the injury is of
such a character as to diminish materially the value of
property as a dwelling or seriously interfere with the ordi-
nary comfort and enjoyment of it. 5
A similar protection to the eye would hardly seem to
establish a new principle but would at most simply extend
a recognized one to its logical conclusion.1 6 The instant
case gives little indication whether or not the Court of
n Smith v. Fairchild, 193 Miss. 536, 10 So. 2d 172 (1942); Clutter v.
Blankenship, 346 Mo. 961, 144 S. W. 2d 119 (1940) ; Heimerle v. Village of
Bronxville, 168 Misc. 783, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 1002 (1938).
12 Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S. C. 88, 21 S. E. 2d 577
(1942) ; Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933).
"Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938).
Fox v. Ewers, 195 Md. 650, 75 A. 2d 357 (1950); Fertilizer Co. v.
Spangler, 86 Md. 562, 39 A. 270 (1898) ; Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co.,
126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915).
"Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A. 2d 656 (1948) ; Hamil-
ton Corporation v. Julian, 130 Md. 587, 101 A. 558 (1917) ; Adams v.
Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873).
1" Somewhat similarly, legislation to regulate the unsightly use of prop-
erty, inspired solely by aesthetic motives, at one time met with great diffi-
culty under the Federal Constitution. Comment, Ae8thetics and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 860 (1916). But note the language
of the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954) :
"The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
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Appeals would be favorably disposed toward such a con-
clusion. The holding, apparently based on a balancing of
the equities of the parties, sidesteps the issue. 7
Roy DIRAooNE
1 TBut note that a century ago, the Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
enjoining maintenance of a bawdy house in the vicinity of the plaintiff's
homes, saying:
i . . If, as the authorities show, the court may interfere where the
physical senses are offended, the comfort of life destroyed, or health
impaired, these alone being the basis of the Jurisdiction, the present
complainants, presenting as they do a case otherwise entitling them
to relief, should not be disappointed merely because the effect of the
process will be to protect their families from the moral taint of such
an establishment as the appellant proposes to open in their immediate
vicinity."
Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128, 147-148 (1857).
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